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The Economics of the Restatement 
and of the Common Law 
Keith N. Hylton† 
INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps the most optimistic view of the American Law 
Institute’s Restatement project was provided at its inception by 
Benjamin Cardozo: 
When, finally, it goes out under the name and with the sanction of 
the Institute, after all this testing and retesting, it will be something 
less than a code and something more than a treatise. It will be 
invested with unique authority, not to command, but to persuade. It 
will embody a composite thought and speak a composite voice. 
Universities and bench and bar will have had a part in its creation. I 
have great faith in the power of such a restatement to unify our law.1 
I will take a somewhat less optimistic view here. The 
incentives of actors in the common law process have been 
examined many times.2 Much less has been said about the 
incentives of actors in the Restatement process. 
Incentives are always something to worry about, at least 
from the perspective of the non-optimist. Holmes referred to 
the law as reflecting a concern for the decisions of the “bad 
man.”3 The Holmesian bad man was not necessarily bad in the 
sense of being evil. He was bad in the sense that he acted solely 
for his own advantage after calculating the private costs and 
benefits of his actions.4 Many lawyers have to consult with bad 
men of this type all of the time. As much as we would like to 
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 1 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 9 (Yale Univ. Press, 1924). 
 2 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (6th ed. 2003); 
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS (3d ed. 2000). 
 3 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 
459-61 (1897). 
 4 Id. 
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emphasize ethics and moral standards in the legal academy, 
lawyers in the real world have to provide advice to clients who 
do not have justice or social welfare at the top of their agendas. 
The common law process itself could be distorted by the 
actions of Holmesian bad men. Judges might decide cases out 
of self-interest or with a disregard for a certain type of litigant. 
The common law process, if it is as good as the evidence 
suggests,5 must have built deep within it some shock absorbers 
to minimize the impact of bad men on its development. In other 
words, the common law process presumably has checks and 
balances that prevent the self-interest of a particular 
embedded actor (judge or lawyer) from having a substantial 
effect. This is a question, in any event, that I will consider here. 
The question that immediately follows is whether the 
Restatement project is also immune—to the same extent as is 
the common law—from the self-interested incentives of actors 
involved in its creation. I will argue that it is far more 
vulnerable to distortion from self-interest than the common law 
process. Because of this, it is an open question whether the 
Restatements will, as Cardozo believed, unify and improve the 
common law. 
I. THE COMMON LAW PROCESS AND SOCIAL WELFARE 
Some impressive legal authorities have defended the 
common law. Blackstone, for example, singlehandedly set out a 
unified account and defense of the common law, as well as its 
history and policies.6 Blackstone’s account, which shaped legal 
education for roughly a century after its publication, describes 
the common law as virtually synonymous with reason and 
holds that any unambiguously unreasonable rule should be 
regarded as not part of the common law—even if a court says 
that it is.7 Blackstone never quite explained what it means for 
the law to be reasonable, but one can infer from his arguments 
that the common law is reasonable because it is based on 
norms adopted by convention. Such norms should be 
reasonable because they reflect implicit agreements or 
conventions that maximize the joint welfare of all interested 
 
 5 See Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 
(1998); Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be 
Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2001). 
 6 See generally WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND (Univ. of Chicago Press 1979). 
 7 Id. at 69-70. 
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parties. These norms would trade off competing interests in an 
objective manner; they would reflect the choices of an impartial 
spectator.8 Courts could discover these norms in the course of 
deciding legal disputes. 
Blackstone’s hazy, almost mystical reverence for reason 
in the common law generated a vicious counterattack by 
Bentham, who argued that reason could only be understood 
from the perspective of self-interest.9 What is reasonable to me, 
Bentham argued, is what I think is good.10 The same goes for 
you. There is no perspective-neutral argument for believing 
that something I find reasonable would also be reasonable in 
your eyes. The common law materializes, then, when one of us 
is able to assert control over the framing of a legal rule. The 
one who prevails declares the law that suits him to be 
reasonable, putting an end to disputes over the law. 
The notion of reasonableness in the common law would 
have its next great defender in Holmes.11 Reasonableness in the 
law resulted, according to Holmes, from trading off competing 
interests in a manner that maximized social welfare. Courts 
sacrifice a dollar of gain to Sam if that gain would result in a 
two-dollar loss to Joe. The rules that emerged from this 
utilitarian balancing did not necessarily reflect underlying 
societal norms that courts had discovered. The rules were 
imposed by courts, as Bentham believed. In the common law 
process, disputes in which the appropriate or prevailing norm 
was unclear were litigated and re-litigated in court until a 
utility-maximizing set of rules was established. 
The most recent defense of the common law is the 
efficiency thesis associated with Posner.12 Common law rules 
tend to be economically efficient, in the sense that they 
minimize social costs. Like Holmes, Posner argues that the 
courts choose these rules without necessarily relying on or 
discovering underlying social norms. Efficiency differs from the 
utility maximization process envisioned by Holmes in the sense 
 
 8 See BRUNO LEONI, FREEDOM AND THE LAW 13-15 (3rd ed. 1991). 
 9 See JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1988); see also GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 
(Clarendon Press 1986). 
 10 Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries, in A COMMENT ON 
THE COMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 159 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart 
eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2008) (“A regulation lies before me. I look at it and pronounce 
that it is ‘unreasonable’: what is it that I mean by this? Just this much and no more; 
that my reason, i.e. I myself, applying to it that faculty in me which is called reason, do 
not approve of it.”). 
 11 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (Little, Brown & Co. 1881). 
 12 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (8th ed. 2011). 
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that efficiency takes markets, explicit and implicit, into 
account.13 An efficient solution is consistent with one that the 
market, in its ideal form free of transactional barriers and 
externalities, would generate. To find the efficient solution, a 
judge need only consult the market or try to imagine what the 
market would have provided. In contrast, utility maximization, 
as stressed by Holmes, does not necessarily attempt to 
replicate an ideal market.14 Utility maximization might result 
in an inefficient outcome that is preferred by a faction with 
intense preferences and control over the law creation process. 
However, outside of this rather special case, the welfare 
maximization and economic efficiency theses are equivalent in 
terms of their implications for the common law. 
The welfare maximization arguments of Holmes and 
Posner do not explain how the common law moves toward 
welfare-maximizing rules. If the law were controlled entirely by 
one judge, and that judge were committed to inefficient 
outcomes, presumably the law would not be efficient or welfare 
maximizing. This suggests that there must be features of the 
common law process that permit reasonable, efficient, or 
welfare-maximizing rules to evolve and to persist. 
Paul Rubin offered what is perhaps the most persuasive 
theory for evolution toward welfare-maximizing common law 
rules.15 Rubin argued that inefficient rules would be litigated 
more often than efficient rules, and, because of this greater 
rate of litigation, inefficient rules would be overturned more 
often than efficient rules.16 Inefficient rules would be litigated 
more because, relative to efficient rules, such rules reduce the 
joint welfare of long-term stakeholders involved in any dispute. 
Given this, the stakeholders would have incentives to overturn 
the rule through litigation. Alternatively, the stakeholders 
could overturn an inefficient rule through private agreement.17 
 
 13 Keith N. Hylton, Calabresi and the Intellectual History of Law and 
Economics, 64 MD. L. REV. 85, 90 (2005). 
 14 Id. 
 15 Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 53 
(1977) (“If rules are inefficient, there will be an incentive for the party held liable to 
force litigation; if rules are efficient, there will be no such incentive.”). 
 16 For example, suppose the likelihood of a rule being overturned is ten 
percent. If inefficient rules are litigated more often than efficient rules, then inefficient 
rules will be overturned more frequently. For a careful examination of this argument, 
see Robert Cooter & Lewis Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law Without the 
Help of Judges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1980). 
 17 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES (Harvard Univ. Press, 1991); Keith N. Hylton & Sungjoon Cho, The 
Economics of Injunctive and Reverse Settlements, 12 AM. LAW & ECON. REV. 181 (2010). 
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For example, suppose property law gave the right to cut 
down the old oak tree on John Doe’s property to Richard Roe, 
Doe’s neighbor. In most cases such as this, John Doe would put 
a higher value on keeping the tree than Richard Roe would put 
on cutting down the tree. Suppose, for example, John Doe 
values the tree at $4,000 and Richard Roe values the absence of 
the tree at $1,000. If the inefficient rule granting the property 
right to Richard Roe were overturned, John Doe would gain 
$4,000 and Richard Roe would lose $1,000; their joint gain 
would be $3,000. If John Doe could sue to overturn the 
inefficient rule for a relatively small expense, he would do so. 
Richard Roe would not be willing to invest more than $1,000 in 
a lawsuit defending his right to cut down the tree. John Doe 
would be willing to spend up to $4,000 to gain the right of 
control over the tree. Given these differences in willingness-to-
pay, litigation is likely to lead eventually to a decision in which 
the property rule giving the neighbor the right of control over 
the tree is overturned. 
In addition to simply challenging inefficient legal rules, 
litigation also provides information to courts. Each litigant has 
strong incentives to reveal every fact that could bolster his side 
of the case. The end result is that a court receives far more 
information, from parties with direct and opposing stakes, than 
any other regulatory or legislative institution in existence. As 
Hayek stressed in relation to markets,18 the litigation process 
induces actors to reveal information that they would otherwise 
keep private.19 
The evolutionary arguments discussed so far leave out 
the role of the law itself. The common law, Blackstone noted, 
equates legal validity with reasonableness.20 This means that 
legal decisions in the common law process have to be justified 
on the basis of reasonableness. Reasonableness typically has 
been explained in terms of the trade-off in competing utilities, 
objectively evaluated, or in terms of the expectations of the 
parties.21 Judges often defend their decisions by highlighting 
the implications their decisions may have on the welfare of 
parties that are in the same positions as the litigants. Those 
 
 18 F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). 
 19 See Keith N. Hylton, Information, Litigation, and Common Law Evolution, 
8 AM. LAW & ECON. REV. 33 (2006) (private information on facts improves common 
law); Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, The Evolution of Common Law, 115 J. POL. 
ECON. 43 (2007) (private policy preferences of judges improve common law over time). 
 20 BLACKSTONE, supra note 4 at 69-70. 
 21 See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY AND 
COMMON LAW EVOLUTION 98-99 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003). 
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justifications become grounds for subsequent reexaminations of 
the legal rule. 
Reasonableness arguments are not infinitely malleable. 
There is only so much spin that you can put on the 
reasonableness justification for a court decision. Return to the 
example of John Doe and Richard Roe. A court could argue that 
the inefficient rule should be deemed reasonable by asserting, 
falsely, that most neighbors would put a higher valuation on 
control over a tree on a given piece of property than would the 
property owner himself.22 But this is an empirical proposition that 
can be tested and proven false. The common law process allows 
for such empirical propositions to be tested in the litigation 
process; indeed, the appeals process provides a direct test of 
relative valuations. The decentralization of the common law 
process implies that empirical propositions will be tested and 
retested, both formally in evaluation by independent judges, 
and informally—though perhaps more effectively—through the 
hurdles of the litigation process. Justifications that are not 
falsified will be accepted and adopted by other courts, which, in 
turn, will lead to a rapid dissemination of the welfare-
maximizing rule. 
The testing and retesting of empirical reasonableness 
propositions in the common law occurs both horizontally—that 
is, among other courts of the same hierarchical status—and 
vertically—that is, among appellate courts of superior status. 
Extremely biased policy preferences held by a minority of judges 
will tend to be cancelled out at the horizontal level, and the 
average set of policy preferences of a band of like-courts will 
prevail.23 Similarly, the appellate process presents the same 
opportunity for judges to reconsider empirically false 
assessments of reasonableness. Courts hearing a case on appeal 
are guided by the information revealed by the opposing parties.24 
The cost of appeal screens out some litigants who have benefited 
from an empirically false assessment of relative costs and 
benefits. The appeals process forces Roe to post a bond, in 
effect, to support his assertion that his valuation of the old oak 
tree exceeds Doe’s. But if Roe does not really care about the 
tree, he is unlikely to accept the burden of appeal. 
 
 22 I do not mean to suggest that the court would deliberately assert a false 
statement. It is sufficient for this argument that judges have different policy 
preferences, and those policy preferences lead them to make different judgments on 
comparative utilities. See Gennaioli & Shleifer, supra note 19. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Hylton, supra note 19. 
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The rule of reason, which has generated specific 
utilitarian balancing tests in the common law, operates as a 
type of core code, or metarule, that facilitates the killing off of 
inefficient rules and the rapid dissemination of efficient rules. 
Because of the discretionary, utilitarian balancing in the common 
law, calibrated in every application by the private information 
revealed by litigants, welfare-maximizing rules emerge at a faster 
rate than would be observed if courts decided cases randomly and 
simply followed the precedent of previous courts. 
The core code inserted by the common law into the 
judicial process is a general utilitarian balancing test that 
compares discrete choices—the rule favored by the defendant 
with the rule favored by the plaintiff. If the rule favored by the 
plaintiff increases the burden on the defendant, but results in a 
trivial benefit to the potential victims, or, even worse, increases 
the risks to other potential victims, then a court would find the 
proposed rule of the plaintiff unreasonable. 
To give just one example, consider Cooley v. Public 
Service Co.25 The plaintiff complained about a traumatic 
neurosis that resulted from a loud explosive noise in her 
telephone. The noise occurred when one of the defendant power 
company’s cables snapped during a heavy storm, landed on a 
telephone cable running several feet beneath it, and burned 
through the telephone cable. The plaintiff argued that the power 
company was guilty of negligence because it failed to maintain 
devices—where its wires crossed over telephone lines—that 
would have prevented the accident that injured her. She 
proposed a wire-mesh basket that would catch the power cable 
before it landed on the telephone line. The court found, however, 
that while the plaintiff’s proposed design reduced the risk of an 
accident of the sort that occurred, it increased the risk of 
electrocution to a person on the street. The court held that an 
accurate assessment of reasonable care would require a 
comparison of the burden of the plaintiff ’s alternative design to 
the net change in aggregate harm resulting from the design.  
Note that in Cooley, the court applied the utilitarian 
balancing test in a manner that compared the specific 
precaution proposed by the plaintiff to its expected net social 
benefits. The standard “Hand Formula” analysis of comparing 
the burden of precaution to the foreseeable loss was modified to 
take into account the foreseeable net social loss. As this case 
illustrates, and as judges and litigants understand, the 
 
 25 Cooley v. Pub. Serv. Co., 10 A.2d 673 (N.H. 1940). 
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reasonableness criterion gives courts the flexibility to modify 
previously adopted algorithms to take into account all of the 
relevant social costs and benefits. 
The core code of the common law allows courts to discover 
welfare-maximizing rules without first having the information 
required to do so. The common law reasonableness requirement 
provides a general balancing test of which litigants are aware. 
The litigants have every incentive to reveal information to the 
court that tips the balancing test in their favor. Judges do not 
need to be experts in a specific area of litigation for the general 
test to favor efficient rules. All judges need to do is recognize the 
nature of the test and allow its application to be determined by 
the factual content provided by the litigating parties. 
The decentralization of the common law process implies 
that a particular faction that wants to see its own welfare-
reducing version of the law adopted in a majority of jurisdictions, 
or within a single jurisdiction containing several independent 
judges, will have to work very hard. The faction may be able to 
persuade a minority of judges, but its work may not have an 
impact on other judges. Moreover, the decisions of the minority of 
judges who were persuaded by the faction are continually 
vulnerable to challenge by opposing litigants. In order to carry 
out an effective lobbying campaign under the common law, a 
faction committed to a particular inefficient legal rule would 
have to litigate continually in virtually every court. Once a 
judge discovers that the faction’s preferred rule is inefficient, 
and explains why it is so in an opinion, other courts are likely 
to be influenced by the reasoning of the better-informed judge. 
II. THE RESTATEMENT PROCESS 
The process I have just described for the common law 
differs from the process by which a Restatement is created. Here 
is a simple model of the Restatement process. A Restatement 
Reporter reads the court opinions in an area of law, say tort law. 
The Reporter then tries to codify the rules that courts have 
applied, and offers interpretive guidance. By “codify,” I mean 
that the Reporter attempts to summarize the common law in 
the form of codes or rules. The Reporter then has his 
codifications approved by the ALI, which means that lawyers, 
judges, and law professors get to look over the Reporter’s 
codification to make sure that it is consistent with their 
readings of the law. A persuasive codification might convince a 
court to change a rule that it had previously adopted. 
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There are many ways in which this process differs from 
the common law process. First, we begin with a single Reporter 
(or maybe more than one Reporter) who eventually writes a 
final rule. In comparison, the common law process does not rely 
on a single judge, and no judge produces a final rule. Every 
rule of the common law is constantly subject to testing by 
parties who have a deep investment in the dispute. Indeed, the 
common law consists of rules and relies on an underlying 
background norm, the rule of reason, to reexamine those rules. 
The rule of reason is sometimes crystallized in the form of 
particular rules—such as, for example, that contributory 
negligence does not bar recovery from an intentional 
wrongdoer26—but those rules are required to be consistent with 
the general rule of reason.27 Because of this ever-present 
requirement, the consideration of new facts might require a 
change in a rule, or a change in the way that a rule is stated, so 
that the rule remains consistent with the background norm. 
A Restatement Reporter who is committed to an 
inefficient rule, or to inefficient rules in general, has 
considerable freedom to interpret common law rules with a 
slant toward inefficiency. That slant is unlikely to be corrected 
by the rule-development process for two reasons. First, there 
are relatively few litigants directly involved with a stake in the 
rule. Second, there are no other Reporters, vertically above or 
horizontally in competition, who are likely to reject the proposed 
rules and publish alternative rules. Of course, there are many 
prominent law professionals who review Restatement drafts, and 
many who provide detailed comments. But as a general matter, 
this type of review is unlikely to involve the same combination of 
intensity and fear as one observes in the litigation process. A 
judge who tells a Reporter that his reading of the law is wrong 
probably has little direct leverage to force the Reporter to change. 
Of course, the ALI has to approve the Reporter’s work, 
which constrains the Reporter’s freedom. But the ALI as a body 
is similar to a population of voters in an election process. The 
typical voter does not have a strong incentive to spend 
resources in determining the validity of any particular claim 
put to a vote.28 Indeed, if the voter believes that his vote is not 
pivotal, he either has weak incentives to replicate the 
 
 26 See, e.g., Ruter v. Foy, 46 Iowa 132 (1877); Steinmetz v. Kelly, 72 Ind. 442 (1880). 
 27 Holmes, supra note 11 at 110-15; see also Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud 
in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 592-3 (1988). 
 28 On the incentives of voters, see DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 
348-50 (1989) and ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 141 (1957). 
604 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:2 
 
Reporter’s research or can easily be persuaded by any side of 
the issue. The problem of rational apathy, apparent in most 
voting processes, is likely to be present to some degree in the 
ALI approval process. 
It is not clear that this process would be improved by 
having multiple Reporters rather than a single Reporter. A single 
Reporter may worry more about permitting his individual 
preferences to control his interpretation of rules than would one of 
many Reporters. A single Reporter may think that his reputation 
would suffer greatly if the whole project were deemed defective 
because of distortions caused by his biases. One of many 
Reporters, on the other hand, may feel that his contribution is 
relatively small, and he therefore gains the benefits of 
imposing his biases while externalizing the costs to the 
Restatement in general. In other words, one of many Reporters 
may be like the franchisee who gets the benefits from cutting 
costs or from enhancing some related business interest, while 
spreading the losses in the form of reduced goodwill across the 
entire franchise network.29 
These arguments suggest that the checks—constraining 
distortions due to self-interest or excessive zeal—observed in 
the common law process are not at work in the Restatement 
process, or at least not at work with the same force. As a result, 
a Reporter who is committed to a particular view of rules—a non-
utilitarian view for example—could impress his perspective upon 
some of the rules that he codifies without running into a serious 
obstacle in the Restatement process. 
In addition, compared to the common law process, the 
ALI process suffers from a greater vulnerability to lobbying. A 
member of an interest group with a particular view of the law 
can contact the ALI Reporter and attempt to persuade him. Of 
course, most ALI Reporters would see through an attempt by 
openly pro-defendant or pro-plaintiff groups to have the law 
interpreted in a manner that favors them. But the lobbying 
effort becomes more difficult to identify when the motive of the 
group is unclear, or when the interest is in the nature of a 
commitment to a particular view of the law. By contrast, 
motivation is never in doubt in the common law process, which 
makes lobbying more difficult. 
These differences between the common law and the ALI 
processes may explain some of the instances in which the ALI 
 
 29 Paul H. Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of Franchise 
Contracts, 21 J. LAW & ECON. 223, 227-28 (1978). 
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process has produced rules that seem to be inconsistent with 
the common law codification goal of the Restatements. I will 
discuss a few of those instances in the next part, confining my 
attention to previous Restatements. 
The First Restatement of Torts and the Second 
Restatement of Torts have both benefited from being under the 
control of the most capable Reporters one could imagine: 
Francis Bohlen oversaw the First Restatement and William 
Prosser oversaw the Second Restatement. Prosser appears to 
have been the most careful of all in his efforts to prevent 
personal bias and opinion from influencing the Restatement. 
George Priest’s critique of his work on products liability, 
however, suggests that Prosser was not entirely immune from 
the bias disease.30 In the remainder of this article, I will 
examine the work of Bohlen and Prosser, and offer a few 
remarks on the Third Restatement. 
A. Bohlen on Consent and Mutual Combat 
An early example of Reporter bias having an effect on 
the Restatement appears in the First Restatement of Torts in 
its rules on mutual combat. Francis Bohlen, the Restatement 
Reporter, had to choose between two rules. One, adopted in the 
majority of states, held that consent to engage in mutual 
combat is not a defense to battery.31 The other, the minority 
rule, held that consent to engage in mutual combat is a defense 
to battery so long as the evidence indicates that the prevailing 
party did not use excessive force or act with an intention to 
severely injure the other party.32 Bohlen, having already 
published a paper in which he criticized the majority rule,33 
adopted the minority rule as the Restatement provision on 
mutual combat.34 He included the proviso that consent would 
not be recognized as a defense in states that had expressed a 
 
 30 See George Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History 
of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUDIES 461, 514 
(1985) (“Prosser’s appendix supported his claim of an explosion in the law toward strict 
liability by the citation of forty cases. A rereading of these cases today suggests either that 
what Prosser meant by strict liability is vastly different from the regime that has evolved or 
that Prosser’s discovery of a trend in the case law was largely his own creation.”). 
 31 See, e.g., Adams v. Waggoner, 33 Ind. 531 (1870); Mullin, 79 P. 168 (Kan. 
1905); Barholt v. Wright, 12 N.E. 185 (Ohio 1887); McNeil v.; Royer v. Belcher, 131 S.E. 
556 (W. Va. 1926). 
 32 Hart v. Geysel, 294 P. 570, 572 (Wash. 1930). 
 33 Francis Bohlen, Consent as Affecting Civil Liability for Breaches of the 
Peace, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 819, 834-35 (1924). 
 34 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 61 (1934). 
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policy of protecting individuals who were unable to fully 
understand the nature of the risk they took on.35 
Setting aside Bohlen’s decision to adopt the minority 
rule as the Restatement provision on mutual combat, his 
reading of the law on consent in the mutual combat context is 
questionable. Hart v. Geysel indicates that the rule recognizing 
consent as a defense was accompanied with a qualification that 
limited the rule’s applicability in cases where the defendant 
used excessive force or intended to severely injure his 
adversary.36 Bohlen ignored this important qualification and 
treated mutual combat as indistinguishable from any other 
setting in which consent might be an issue. 
As a general matter, treating mutual combat as 
indistinguishable from any other setting in which consent is an 
issue introduces confusion into the law. The common law has 
long assessed physical contact using special rules when 
questions of consent are presented. One’s consent to the nature 
of the act and the identity of the actor generally operates as a 
valid assent to physical contact.37 Someone who consents to a 
touch in exchange for a counterfeit $100 dollar bill, fully aware 
of the nature of the touch and the person doing the touching, 
does not have a claim for battery against the party who inflicts 
the touch; he only has a claim for fraud or for contract breach. 
At first glance, this seems hard to reconcile with the law of 
battery. To establish a prima facie claim for battery, one must 
only show a touch was motivated by an intention to inflict a 
potentially harmful bodily contact. Touches that occur after 
fraudulently induced consent would appear to be based on a 
desire to inflict harmful bodily contact, but the law does not 
treat them as such. In contrast to the law, Bohlen’s treatment 
of the consent question in the mutual combat setting imposes a 
contractual framework over the question of consent to a touch, 
suggesting generally that any fraudulent misrepresentation as 
to the basis for a touch might justify bringing a battery claim. 
A student of the law, exposed early to Bohlen’s work, would be 
set on a path that would require correction later. 
The more serious and practical problem introduced by 
Bohlen’s Restatement provision is its failure to incorporate the 
excessive force qualification of the minority rule. If one looks 
closely at the qualification adopted in the minority rule 
 
 35 Id. § 69. 
 36 See Hart, 294 P. at 572. 
 37 R. v. Clarence, 22 Q.B.D. 23 (U.K. 1888). 
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jurisdictions, it has the effect of severely limiting the role of 
consent as a defense or excuse. In essence, the qualification 
holds that consent is a defense in the mutual combat setting, 
except when the injuring party has gone too far. This 
qualification makes consent an extremely thin defense. 
There is a good reason for this limiting qualification. If 
one considers the typical setting in which the party injured in 
mutual combat sues the injuring party, it is likely that the 
injuring party has used excessive force under the circumstances. 
One excessive force scenario is where the injuring party has 
pushed his advantage too far, to the point of overkill. In a case 
of overkill, the injuring party continues to punch the injured 
party long after he is unable to put up a fight. Another 
excessive force scenario involves an asymmetry of force, as in 
the case where one combatant uses a knife on another who uses 
only his fists. The injured party, feeling that the treatment he 
received from the injuring party went well beyond the implicit 
terms of the agreement, would see nothing incongruous in 
suing for battery after having agreed to the fight. A spectator, 
having observed the whole scenario, probably would not find 
the injured party’s decision to sue unreasonable, too. 
On the other hand, consider the mutual fistfight where 
the injuring combatant gets in a good punch, and then steps 
back to let the injured combatant fall. This is not a case of 
overkill or asymmetric force. The reasonable participant in 
mutual combat would realize that he had received the 
treatment that he had contracted for. 
A representative sample of mutual combat cases, 
presented below in Table 1, shows that the cases in which 
defendants are held liable, whether analyzed under the majority 
or the minority rule, contain evidence of excessive force. The least 
clear example of excessive force among these sample cases is 
McNeil v. Mullin;38 the court provides little detail on the 
exchange of blows. But the court’s references to the defendant’s 
commission of a mayhem suggest that the defendant used 
excessive force. Mayhem, a common law crime and trespass, is 
the intentional cutting off or destroying of an appendage of the 
victim’s body, such as a hand or finger, so that the victim is left 
unable or less able to defend himself in battle.39 Although the 
details of the encounter described in McNeil mainly cover the 
exchange of insults leading up to the fight rather than the fight 
 
 38 McNeil v. Mullin, 79 P. 168 (Kan. 1905). 
 39 BLACKSTONE, supra note 4 at 121. 
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itself, it is hard to see how an ordinary fistfight could result in the 
commission of a mayhem in the absence of the use of excessive or 
inappropriate force. The precise type of mayhem inflicted on the 
plaintiff is not described in the opinion, but the least injurious 
that one could imagine—say, the biting off of a finger—would 
easily qualify as excessive force under the circumstances. 
The sample cases also suggest that a finding of 
excessive force is necessary for liability in the minority rule 
cases. The key difference between the majority and minority 
rule cases appears to be that if the evidence of excessive force is 
unclear, then there generally will be no liability under the 
minority rule. The majority rule, in contrast, does not require 
evidence of excessive force in order to hold a combatant liable, 
but moderates (or mitigates) damages according to the reciprocal 
nature of the exchange.40 In terms of the incentives to file suit, 
or to engage in combat, the minority and majority rules may be 
roughly equivalent. 
  
 
 40 See Littledike v. Wood, 255 P. 172, 174 (Utah 1927) (“The claim made is 
that who committed the first act of violence was material in mitigation of damages. The 
fact that the parties mutually engaged in a combat, though with anger, may be relied 
upon and considered in mitigation of damages; but in such case who struck the first 
blow, or committed the first act of violence, is in and of itself of no controlling nor 
important factor of the question, for in such a mutual combat both parties are 
aggressors and voluntary combatants. The court well could have charged the jury that 
in case of mutual combat such fact properly could and should be considered in 
mitigation of damages, except where an injury of a serious character was maliciously 
inflicted by excessive and unreasonable force, or in a vicious or brutal manner. We 
think no error was committed in the particular as claimed.”); Adams v. Waggoner, 33 
Ind. 531, 533 (1870); Barholt v. Wright, 12 N.E. 185, 188 (Ohio St. 1887); Royer v. 
Belcher, 131 S.E. 556, 556-557 (W. Va. 1926). 
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF MUTUAL COMBAT CASES 
Case Rule  Excessive Force? Fact Summary Liability 
Adams v. 
Waggoner, 
33 Ind. 531 
(1870) 
Majority Some evidence of 
overkill, but court does 
not go into detail. 
The two men engaged 
in a mutual fight, but 
the defendant brought 
out a knife and 
severely wounded the 
plaintiff. 
Yes 
Barhold v. 
Wright, 12 
N.E. 185 
(Ohio 1887) 
Majority Yes, the court called 
the excess a “mayhem.” 
The parties consented 
to fight one another, 
but the defendant bit 
off the plaintiff ’ s 
finger. 
Yes 
Smith v. 
Simon, 37 
N.W. 548 
(Mich. 1888) 
Minority No excessive cruelty or 
unnecessary beating or 
harshness. 
Defendant broke 
plaintiff ’ s arm and 
dislocated his 
shoulder. They agreed 
mutually to fight “in 
fun.” The parties were 
wrestling. 
 
No 
White v. 
Whittall, 71 
N.W. 1118 
(Mich. 1897) 
Minority Short opinion, court 
views the offensive 
contact as mutual. 
 
Parties began a fight 
in the middle of the 
highway, using 
offensive language in 
front of their children. 
Both were equally 
“eager for the fray.” 
No 
Mc.Neil v. 
Mullin, 79 
P. 168 
(Kan. 1905) 
Majority Yes, the Petition 
Against the defendant 
is for injuries sustained 
from a mayhem. 
A series of insulting 
comments back in 
forth resulted in both 
men getting off their 
buggies, taking off 
their hat and coat, 
and having a fistfight. 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Milam v. 
Milam, 90 
P. 595 
(Wash. 1907) 
Probably 
Minority 
Yes, the biting of the 
knuckle was “cruel and 
unjustifiable.” 
Parties got into a 
dispute after one 
accused the other of 
telling lies in court, 
resulting in a struggle 
and a fistfight. 
Plaintiff ’ s knuckle 
was bitten off and 
finger was broken. 
 
Yes 
Lykins v. 
Hamrick, 
137 S.W. 
852 (Ky. 
1911) 
Minority No, both used knives, 
and when they 
separated, both were 
injured but neither too 
severely. 
Parties were 
neighbors and friends 
for a long time. They 
fought with knives in 
the front yard after 
one made offensive 
remarks towards the 
other.  
 
No 
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If the excessive force scenarios just described explain 
the vast majority of cases in which individuals injured in 
mutual combat sue their opponents, then, as a practical 
matter, the excessive force qualification attached to the 
minority rule swallows the consent portion of the rule. There 
would be few cases in which a willing prizefight participant 
brought suit and won substantial damages against an opponent 
who had obtained a victory by fair means and who did not use 
excessive force. The circumstances most likely to give rise to a 
battery lawsuit would be those where the consent defense is 
precluded by the excessive force qualification. 
Indeed, the law on mutual combat appears to follow a 
rather simple set of utilitarian principles: as the danger of the 
type of mutual combat increases, the scope of prohibition 
expands, and the extent to which consent serves as a defense to 
battery narrows. The most dangerous types of mutual combat, 
including combat with deadly weapons, were prohibited, and 
consent to engage in such contests would not serve as a 
defense.41 Dueling with guns or swords, for example, was illegal 
 
 41 See Hart, 294 P. at 573 (Holcomb, J., dissenting) (“Had it been a duel, it 
would have been unlawful and consent to fight a duel would not prevent recovery by 
either those injured, on the ground of excessive force, or the heirs or personal 
representatives of those injured.”). 
Case Rule  Excessive Force? Fact Summary Liability 
Colby v. 
McClendon, 
206 P. 207 
(Okla. 1922) 
Majority Although there was no 
overkill, it was with 
deadly weapons so 
majority rule applies. 
Gunfight ensued after 
a dispute over a land 
conveyance, resulting 
in the death of the 
decedent and another 
party. 
Yes 
Royer v. 
Belcher, 
131 S.E. 
556 (W. Va. 
1926) 
Majority Some evidence of 
overkill, in light of the 
plaintiff ’ s inability to 
respond with equal 
force. 
Defendant’s wife 
informed him of an 
insulting remark 
made by the plaintiff. 
D went to P’s house 
where a fight broke 
out. D repeatedly 
punched P resulting 
in P losing his glasses 
and physical injuries 
requiring a doctor. 
Yes 
Littledike v. 
Wood, 255 
P. 172 
(Utah 1927) 
Majority Yes, defendant kicked 
plaintiff in the ribs 
after he was almost 
unconscious. 
After a dispute over 
hay bales, the parties 
engaged in a fight. 
Plaintiff was kicked in 
the ribs causing a 
punctured lung. He 
also lost some teeth, 
and his face was cut 
and bruised. 
Yes 
2014] ECONOMICS OF THE RESTATEMENT AND COMMON LAW 611 
 
and consent to such dueling would not serve as a defense in a 
lawsuit brought by an injured party.42 Perhaps a sufficient 
reason for prohibiting such duels is that they put innocent 
third parties at risk of injury or death. The next level down 
from dueling is boxing. Boxing can be as deadly as dueling. On 
the other hand, boxing with padded gloves is likely to be less 
dangerous, depending on how the conduct is carried out.43 
Given the variation in the level of danger associated with 
boxing—to participants and to third parties—the degree to 
which consent could serve as a defense should vary according 
to the specific danger level of the particular contest. The 
minority rule, as originally stated in the law, appears to be 
consistent with this utilitarian intuition. 
Of course, once we consider the administrative costs of 
distinguishing battery cases resulting from mutual combat 
based on the degree of danger under the circumstances, we can 
see immediately why the majority rule is attractive. It offers a 
simple, straightforward statement of the law that usually 
produces the same outcome as the more fine-grained minority 
rule. When administrative costs and risks of error are taken 
into account, the majority rule is probably preferable on 
utilitarian grounds to the minority rule, even though the 
minority rule does a better job of tracking the regulatory 
dictates of the utilitarian. 
In any event, Bohlen appears to have given little 
consideration to these issues and instead fashioned a 
Restatement rule on mutual combat that is not reflected in 
either the majority or minority rules of the common law. 
Bohlen’s new rule was approved by the ALI and is part of the 
First Restatement of Torts.44 
Bohlen’s rule may seem to be welfare maximizing on the 
simple basis that it allows for freedom of contract: if people 
want to engage in mutual combat, let them do so, and let them 
take the injuries that come with it without allowing them to 
shift any losses to others. But this simple version of freedom of 
contract misses important features of the mutual combat 
problem that were reflected in the law. 
 
 42 Id. 
 43 Even the use of boxing gloves cannot prevent long term injury from 
sustaining repeated concussions—and may increase the risk of such injuries. See, e.g., 
Antoinette Vacca, Boxing: Why It Should Be Down for the Count, 13 SPORTS LAW. J. 
207, 216 (2006). 
 44 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 61 (1934). 
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The most important features that Bohlen’s rule misses 
are the risk of escalation and the substantial risk to third 
parties. The rules on mutual combat were developed over a 
period when men dueled openly in public streets with guns or 
swords. A verbal slight might require a man to save face 
through an invitation to a deadly contest.45 Whatever its 
advantages in regulating aggressive conduct,46 mutual combat, 
especially with deadly weapons, imposes risks of unanticipated 
escalation and serious injury to third parties. Because of this, 
mutual combat is not simply a matter of allocating risks and 
rewards within a contract between two combatants. The 
welfare-maximizing rule on mutual combat would impose a 
prohibition first, and then examine possible exceptions based 
on the level of danger to society. 
The common law appears to have adopted this approach. 
The states that adopted the majority rule drew a distinction 
between mutual combat that threatened public order and mutual 
combat that did not.47 The majority rule denying consent any 
force as a defense applied only to the former.48 
Bohlen’s work on mutual combat serves as an example 
of the sort of bias that can distort the Restatement process in a 
way that is not observed in the common law process. The 
consent rule fashioned by Bohlen is disconnected to some of the 
fundamental rules and policies reflected in the common law on 
mutual combat. Bohlen’s work reflects his vision of how the law 
should look, not what the law provided. If it were a rule 
generated by a particular judge, it probably would not have 
survived the testing (and retesting) process of the common law. 
B. Prosser 
According to Priest’s famous critique of Prosser’s work 
on the Restatement (Second) of Torts’s Section 402A on 
products liability, Prosser persuaded the ALI to adopt its strict 
products liability theory on the basis of a small set of cases 
that, at best, provided weak support for Prosser’s theory.49 If 
 
 45 See Christopher G. Kingston & Robert E. Wright, The Deadliest of Games: 
The Institution of Dueling, 76 S. ECON. J. 1094, 1095 (2010). 
 46 Warren F. Schwartz et al., The Duel: Can These Gentlemen Be Acting 
Efficiently?, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 321 (1984) (offering an efficiency theory of dueling). 
 47 Teeters v. Frost, 292 P. 356, 359-360 (Okla. 1930). 
 48 Id. 
 49 George Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of 
the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 514 (1985) 
(“Prosser’s appendix supported his claim of an explosion in the law toward strict 
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Priest’s observation is true, then Prosser’s work serves as 
another example of the Restatement process failing to 
accurately reflect the development of the common law. Put 
another way, it may be another example in which the 
preferences of a Restatement Reporter have distorted the 
common law in a manner that probably could not have occurred 
if the Reporter had been just the author of a judicial opinion.50 
Priest’s critique is easily discounted today, particularly 
given that the law has advanced well beyond Prosser’s 
formulation of Section 402A. Courts have generated a risk-utility 
analysis for products liability that effectively incorporates the 
structure of negligence doctrine. Now that products liability 
shares its most important features with traditional negligence 
analysis, there is little reason to worry about the common law 
on products liability retaining significant distortions 
attributable to the Restatement Section 402A. 
Still, in spite of the successful integration of negligence 
principles in products liability law, the common law on products 
liability remains in a confusing state, and commentators have 
struggled to find the consistent patterns in the case law. 
Professors Henderson and Twerski, as Restatement Reporters on 
products liability, have advanced our understanding greatly by 
providing a consistent doctrinal framework for the confusingly 
stated and balkanized case law.51 
I suspect that the law on products liability would have 
developed in a clearer fashion without the distortion initially 
provided by Prosser’s Section 402A. The courts have evolved 
toward a liability framework that has been available for hundreds 
of years. The process of evolution has required some courts to 
stumble over the language of the Section until eventually 
working their way toward a clear theory of products liability 
law grounded in negligence doctrine. 
                                                                                                                                  
liability by the citation of forty cases. A rereading of these cases today suggests either that 
what Prosser meant by strict liability is vastly different from the regime that has evolved or 
that Prosser’s discovery of a trend in the case law was largely his own creation.”). 
 50 I must distinguish my critique of Prosser from a recent article that 
suggests that Prosser fell under the influence of tobacco lawyers. See Elizabeth 
Laposata, Richard L. Barnes & Stanton Arnold Glantz, Tobacco Industry Influence on 
the American Law Institute’s Restatements of Torts and Implications for Its Conflict of 
Interest Policies, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2012). That tobacco lawyers lobbied Prosser does 
not point unavoidably to the conclusion that he was excessively influenced by their 
views. I remain confident of Prosser’s independence from special-interest groups and 
hold his work in the highest regard. 
 51 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. (1998) (James A. 
Henderson, Jr. and Aaron D. Twerski, Reporters). 
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Modern design defect litigation has adopted what is 
essentially a negligence test for designs: the risk-utility test. 
The test could have easily developed from the common law 
process without the injection of the strict liability concept in 
Section 402A. Indeed, the case of the electric power lines 
discussed earlier in Cooley is an early example of a court 
applying a risk-utility test to a negligence claim based on the 
design of a power delivery system.52 The basic theories of 
modern products liability law have been in the courts for 
hundreds of years. The current consensus on the legal standard 
could have developed just as quickly, and I believe even more 
quickly, without Restatement Section 402A. 
C. Third Restatement 
The Restatement (Third) of Torts has been in the hands 
of many capable Reporters. Unlike the First and Second 
Restatements, the Third Restatement does not appear to be 
developing under the control of one specific torts scholar. Having 
said this, some Reporters have had a bigger impact on the 
Restatement (Third) project than others because of the scope of 
the pieces they controlled. My late dear friend, Gary Schwartz, 
incorporated noticeable changes within the Restatement’s 
section for Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm.53 
Gary Schwartz was effectively the dean of torts scholars 
in America before his untimely death. For many years, tort 
scholarship has been divided into utilitarian and corrective 
justice camps—a division that crystallized as the sophistication 
of scholarship advanced. Gary Schwartz was the rare example 
of a scholar whose advice was accepted willingly by scholars in 
both camps. He steadfastly maintained a position of 
detachment from either camp, and discussed their respective 
arguments from an independent point of view. A good law 
school dean is both an intellectual leader and a force for 
reconciliation among opposing factions on a law faculty. Gary 
Schwartz filled this role for torts scholars. His absence has 
been and remains a serious loss for torts scholarship. 
Having an open mind and a willingness to listen to all 
perspectives, however, did not prevent Schwartz from picking 
and choosing among arguments. Indeed, Schwartz was 
aggressive in imposing his views on the Third Restatement. Two 
 
 52 See Cooley v. Pub. Serv. Co., 10 A.2d 673 (N.H. 1940). 
 53 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOTIONAL HARM (2012). 
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areas in which Schwartz incorporated drastic changes in the 
Restatement are the law of duty and the law of strict liability. 
1. Schwartz on Duty 
In his capacity as Restatement Reporter, Schwartz 
treated duty as essentially a “wild card” doctrine in tort law. 
Courts could resort to it when they found special policy or 
pragmatic reasons that a defendant should not be held liable 
even though a straightforward examination of the breach and 
causation issues would point toward liability.54 In other words, 
duty doctrine was an empty vessel into which courts poured 
their case-specific policy views whenever those views required 
a deviation from the standard application of negligence law. 
This was not a new argument. Prosser had described 
duty doctrine in the same terms in his hornbook. The difference, 
however, is that Prosser confined his views on the function of 
duty doctrine to his hornbook and did not attempt to incorporate 
them into the Restatement (Second).55 Indeed, Prosser’s 
Restatement (Second) is respectful of negligence’s traditional 
four-part analysis of duty, breach, causation, and damages. 
Schwartz updated the Restatement portion on negligence to 
relegate the duty component to a secondary role. 
I agree broadly with both Prosser and Schwartz on the 
necessarily ad hoc and pragmatic function of duty doctrine in 
negligence law. And like them, I believe it plays a secondary 
role. Unlike Schwartz—and to some extent unlike Prosser, 
too—I have attempted to explain in utilitarian terms the 
precise function duty doctrine plays in tort law.56 Duty is not an 
empty vessel used to hold the momentary pragmatic concerns 
that a particular case may generate. Rather, duty doctrine 
 
 54 Id. § 7 cmt. a (“[I]n some categories of cases, reasons of principle or policy 
dictate that liability should not be imposed. In these cases, courts use the rubric of duty 
to apply general categorical rules withholding liability.”). 
 55 See John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) 
and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 674 (2001) (“It would not 
be surprising to learn that Prosser was attracted to the formulation of Section 281 in part 
because it avoided talk of duty. However, Prosser kept some distance between his 
academic critique of the concept of duty in law review articles, and his active deployment 
of that concept in a Restatement or treatise. . . . Prosser continued to rely on the 
traditional four-part formula through several editions of his treatise and casebook.”). 
 56 Keith N. Hylton, Duty in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 75 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1501 (2006). 
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shows consistent patterns and performs identifiable functions 
in tort law.57 
As between Prosser and Schwartz, I favor Prosser’s 
approach. Prosser recognized the policy bases for duty doctrine, 
though he never attempted to set out a general theory on the 
subject. He saw that there was sufficient substance to respect the 
role of duty doctrine in negligence law, and for that reason did not 
attempt to minimize its importance in the Second Restatement. 
Schwartz, in contrast, had little patience for mystical 
and tradition-based arguments. He was aware of the policy 
conjectures that Prosser had set out, but Schwartz believed 
Prosser’s account fell short of providing a rigorous functional 
theory of duty doctrine. At the time that Schwartz approached 
the subject, there was no functional account of duty doctrine. 
And although Schwartz listened to all perspectives with 
respect, he could be counted on to reject a non-rigorous, purely 
tradition-based argument. Seeing no rigorous argument for 
giving duty doctrine an important status in the structure of 
negligence law, Schwartz relegated it to a secondary position. 
To give just one example of what a richer account of 
duty doctrine would entail, consider the law governing the duty 
of self-care in the course of a rescue attempt. Eckert v. Long 
Island Railroad58 holds that a person who is injured by the 
defendant in the course of an attempt to rescue a third party 
will be found liable of contributory negligence only if his 
conduct is reckless.59 In terms of duty analysis, Eckert relieves 
the rescuer of a duty of ordinary care with respect to his own 
safety; he breaches the duty of care only by engaging in 
reckless conduct.60 What is the function of this relief? The relief 
serves, in effect, as a subsidy to rescuers. The law on rescue 
shows a reluctance to punish individuals for failing to rescue. 
At the same time, it provides liability relief to those who 
attempt to rescue. To use Saul Levmore’s analogy, the law of 
 
 57 Id. at 1501-02 (summarizing the functions of duty law: to subsidize 
desirable activities by removing the threat of liability, to support property rights, and 
to prevent liability risk from distorting markets). 
 58 Eckert v. Long Island R.R. Co., 43 N.Y. 502, 506 (1871). 
 59 Id. (“The law has so high a regard for human life that it will not impute 
negligence to an effort to preserve it, unless made under such circumstances as to 
constitute rashness in the judgment of prudent persons. For a person engaged in his 
ordinary affairs, or in the mere protection of property, knowingly and voluntarily to 
place himself in a position where he is liable to receive a serious injury, is negligence, 
which will preclude a recovery for an injury so received; but when the exposure is for 
the purpose of saving life, it is not wrongful, and therefore not negligent unless such as 
to be regarded either rash or reckless.”). 
 60 Id. 
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rescue is a policy leaning toward carrots and away from 
sticks.61 Such a view of the law governing rescue provides a set 
of policies that a Restatement Reporter could use in examining 
details in the case law on the subject matter.62 A richer 
understanding of duty doctrine provides not just a one-off 
explanation for a particular case, but a basis for reconsidering 
a set of doctrines associated with a recurrent scenario. 
2. Schwartz on Strict Liability 
The other major change Schwartz imposed in the Third 
Restatement is the provision on strict liability for hazardous 
activities. Schwartz replaced the Second Restatement’s six-part 
test for strict liability with a simpler, two-part test.63 
Under Prosser’s guidance, the Second Restatement 
created a six-part test for strict liability. Found in Section 520, 
the test evaluated whether: (1) the risk of harm is great, (2) the 
harm that would occur is great, (3) the harm could not be 
prevented by reasonable care, (4) the activity is not one of 
common usage, (5) the activity is inappropriate for its location, 
and (6) the social value of the activity is not sufficient to offset 
the risks.64 The six-factor test of Section 520 appears to be 
consistent with the common law of strict liability.65 
The Third Restatement replaces the six-factor test with 
a two-factor test. The Third Restatement eliminates the last 
two factors and collapses the first three parts of Section 520 into 
one question—is the residual risk of harm great when the 
defendant takes care? The comments to this section of the 
Restatement soften the impact of these changes by reintroducing 
the “benefit to the plaintiff” as a factor to be considered in 
analyzing strict liability.66 
The different formulations of the strict liability test in 
the Second and Third Restatements are capable of being 
 
 61 Saul Levmore, Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive 
Structure of the Law of Affirmative Obligations, 72 VA. L. REV. 879, 882-94 (1986). 
 62 On the case for integrating instrumentalist policy reasoning with the 
Restatement process, see Keith N. Hylton, The Theory of Tort Doctrine and the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1413 (2001). 
 63 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 20(b) (2011) (“An activity is abnormally dangerous if: (1) the activity creates a 
foreseeable and highly significant risk of physical harm even when reasonable care is 
exercised by all actors; and (2) the activity is not one of common usage.”). 
 64 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977). 
 65 See Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Nuisance Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW, 323-43 (K. Ayotte & H.E. Smith eds., 2011). 
 66 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 20(b), cmt. k. 
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interpreted so that they are consistent with one another and 
produce the same outcome in any particular case. One could 
argue, for example, that the commonality inquiry of the Third 
Restatement incorporates the “appropriateness” and “value” 
inquiries of the last two parts of Section 520 in the Second 
Restatement. But if one chooses not to read the tests so that 
they are equivalent, then one is left with the claim that an 
examination of commonality does all of the work that used to 
be accomplished by the last two factors of Section 520. 
This is a doubtful claim. Commonality is an empirical 
question that is easy to address in extreme cases but otherwise 
difficult to answer. Was the storage of water—to be used as a 
source of power for a production facility—common at the time 
of Rylands v. Fletcher?67 I suspect the answer is yes, though I 
am also inclined to believe that this is a matter of opinion. 
Certainly the storage of water for the purpose of powering mills 
was not a rare phenomenon in the middle 1800s.68 
How does one determine if an activity is sufficiently 
common to merit an exemption from strict liability? The 
obvious question that follows any attempt to determine 
whether something is common is to ask “common relative to 
what”? The commonality test of the Third Restatement sounds 
deceptively simple, but it raises more questions than it answers. 
I am not sure that the commonality test, by itself, would support 
the court’s conclusion in Rylands v. Fletcher, which is a deeply 
troubling turn of affairs. The Restatement project, which has 
admirably attempted to codify the doctrine of strict liability, 
has at length found its way to a rule that appears to be 
incompatible with the framework set out in Rylands v. 
Fletcher. If accepted literally by courts, the Third Restatement’s 
commonality test would mark a significant departure from the 
common law of strict liability 
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing examples are instances in which the 
individual preferences of Restatement Reporters have led them 
to interpret and describe the law in a way that is not consistent 
with the common law at the time of their reports. What 
explains these excesses? I think it largely comes down to the 
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checks and balances inherent in the common law process and 
their absence in the Restatement process. 
Everyone comes to work with their preferences, 
including judges. Rational individuals will always act to satisfy 
their preferences within the constraints that are set before 
them. Duty can be defined generally as acting against the 
satisfaction of one’s own preferences in order to carry out the 
requirements of some position or station in society. The law 
provides a set of constraints that restrict the freedom of 
individuals to act exclusively in a manner that satisfies their 
own preferences. The relatively few individuals who are 
motivated by an internal sense of duty have little need for the 
law’s constraints. But just as the law constrains individuals in 
their interactions with others, the common law process 
constrains judges from operating according to their own 
preferences at all times. 
An individual judge writes with a keen awareness that 
his arguments will be reviewed by later courts, which, by itself, 
constrains the tendency to substitute one’s own interpretive 
preferences for an objective rendering of the law and its 
associated policies. The review process permits well-reasoned 
arguments to have a continuing impact on the law, while the 
poorly reasoned arguments are discarded. The reasonableness 
standard in the common law of torts provides a utilitarian 
metarule to guide courts in making decisions. Thus, judges are 
constrained by their perceptions of the likelihood of review, 
constrained in fact by a survivorship bias in the common law 
(only the best-reasoned arguments survive the process of 
review by other courts), and constrained by an overarching 
utilitarian framework for policy. 
These constraints are not part of the Restatement 
process. An individual Reporter can find latitude, even if only 
interstitially, to substitute his own preferences, or those of a 
lobbying agent, for an objective description of the law and its 
policies. Once these preferences become embedded in a 
Restatement provision, they can have a distortive effect on the 
development of the common law. Instead of unifying the common 
law, as Cardozo thought would happen, the Restatement can 
create inconsistencies and distortions, in law and in policy, 
which courts will be left to sort through over time.  
